Search suggestions can leak restricted document titles before retrieval begins. Apply the appropriate permission boundary to autocomplete, recent-query lists, counts, and previews as well as full search results.
Titles and metadata can be sensitive
A document title may reveal a planned acquisition, personnel action, customer relationship, or internal incident. Hiding the body does not make a suggestion harmless when the user is not authorised to know the resource exists.
For a proposed suggestion service, derive trusted user scope and limit eligible metadata before ranking or display. Keep personalised history separate from shared suggestions, with explicit access and retention rules.
Do not rely on the interface to conceal returned restricted values. If the API sends them to an unauthorised browser, the boundary has already failed even when the visible component filters them out.
Test a fictional confidential project title
A restricted document is named “Project Harbor acquisition review.” A general employee types “Har” into search. The title, result count, and related snippets should follow the approved visibility policy rather than appearing because the prefix matches.
An authorised project member can receive the permitted suggestion. After their access is removed, cached autocomplete and recent-source widgets need the defined revocation behaviour too.
| Suggestion path | Assertion |
|---|---|
| Prefix autocomplete | Only eligible metadata returned |
| Shared popular searches | No protected user or source leakage |
| Recent documents | Current user scope respected |
| Result counts | Defined metadata-disclosure policy |
| Browser/API response | No hidden unauthorised payload values |
Use synthetic titles and inspect raw supported responses, caches, and rendered output. A screenshot alone cannot establish that the browser never received the restricted title.
Balance usefulness and visibility
Permission-aware suggestions can require additional filtering and may return fewer items. That is preferable to broad metadata disclosure. Improve allowed-source relevance rather than weakening scope to make the dropdown look full.
Some organisations deliberately allow resource discovery while restricting content. If so, encode that explicit policy; do not assume it universally. Titles, existence, snippets, and body access can have different authorised behaviours that require separate tests.
This suggestion design is proposed. The voice integration case study describes related retrieval work without claiming this interface. Pair it with sensitive retrieval-log metadata.
Include a user-switch fixture on a shared workstation. A previous authorised session’s suggestion cache must not populate the next user’s dropdown after the supported sign-out transition.
Search title FAQ
Is a title always public metadata?
No. Its disclosure depends on the actual resource and policy.
Can client-side filtering protect suggestions?
Enforce the boundary before unauthorised metadata reaches the client.
What should be tested after revocation?
Autocomplete, recent items, cached suggestions, counts, previews, and source links under the supported policy.